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STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHEN
SECTION 301 AND FAIR REPRESENTATION
CLAIMS ARE JOINED: MUST THEY BE
THE SAME?
INTRODUCTION
The collective bargaining agreement between a union and an
employer' "most pointedly shapes the rights and duties for a mass of
third persons, the employees in the plant."' Therefore, section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 3 has been inter-
preted as permitting an aggrieved employee to bring suit against his
employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.4 An em-
1. The collective bargaining agreement is the result of the collective bargaining
process between the union, acting on behalf of the employees it represents, and the
employer. R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Lav 540 (1976). Its purpose is "to create
the framework within which labor and management are to function together." lodice
v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 512 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Cox, The Legal Nature of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1958); Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 663 (1973); Sum-
mers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 Yale L.J. 525 (1969).
2. R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 540; accord, Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agree-
ment, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 606 (1956); Cox, supra note 1, at 5; Feller, supra note
1, at 719-20; Summers, supra note 1, at 528. Although the collective bargaining
agreement is rarely considered an employment contract between an employer and an
employee, J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944), it does govern such
matters as hiring and wages, id. at 334-35, seniority, Local 1251, UAW v. Robert-
shaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), discharge, Boone v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1967), and grievance procedures.
Local 19, Warehouse, Processing & Distributive Workers Union v. Buckeye Cotton
Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776, 779 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This section provides, in part, that "[s]uits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." One of
the basic aims of Congress in enacting § 301 was to ensure enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947) ("[T]o en-
courage the making of agreements and to promote industrial peace through faithful
performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting interstate commerce
should be enforceable in the Federal courts."); see Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50,
Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1962); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957). Section 301 is not
limited to collective bargaining agreements. The word "contracts" in § 301 has also
been held to refer to strike settlement agreements, Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Lion
Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962), pension agreements, Savoretti v. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Pension Fund, 470 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), and
union constitutions. Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 917 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 976 (1963).
4. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976); Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962); Sheeran v. General Elec. Co.,
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ployee's right to sue his employer, however, is not absolute. When
the collective bargaining agreement provides that the grievance pro-
cedure set forth is the exclusive remedy for employee claims, an em-
ployee must show that he has attempted to exhaust that remedy
before he will be allowed to sue his employer.' He will be excused
from the exhaustion of remedies requirement, however, if he can
show that he was prevented from fulfilling it by the union's breach of
its duty of fair representation. 6
The union's duty of fair representation judicially evolved from sec-
tion 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).7 The leading
593 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Ely v. Hall's Motor
Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978); Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.,
582 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1978). Employee § 301 suits against employers include
actions alleging loss of seniority in violation of seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442,
445 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975), wrongful discharge in violation of
just cause provisons of the collective bargaining agreement, Abrams v. Carrier Corp.,
434 F.2d 1234, 1242 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971), and nonpay-
ment of vacation compensation in violation of relevant terms of the collective bar-gaining agreement. Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 585 (D. Minn. 1973).
A union may sue on behalf of the employees it represents for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(b) (1976).
5. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,
652-53 (1965); Hayes v. New England Millwork Distribs., Inc., 602 F.2d 15, 18 (1st
Cir. 1979); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Ford, 590 F.2d 557, 558 (4th Cir. 1979); Warren
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337-38 (8th Cir. 1976); Beriault v.
Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's & Warchousemen's
Union, 501 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1974); Orphan v. Furneo Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 1972); Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864,
865 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969); Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
384 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1967); MeConney v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 455 F.
Supp. 1143, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Savage v. Kibbee, 426 F. Supp. 760, 767
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Ford, 590 F.2d 557, 558
n.2 (4th Cir. 1979); Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 294-95 (1st
Cir. 1978); Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375, 376-77
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 n.2 (9th Cir.
1977); Warren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 1976);
Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 1972). The employee
will also be excused from the exhaustion of remedies requirement if he can show that
an attempt to fulfill it would be futile. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1969) (employer and union conspired to discriminate against plaintiff em-
ployee); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967) (dicta) (employer repudiated griev-
ance procedures provided for in the collective bargaining agreement).
7. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345
U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 725, 727
(W.D. Va. 1975). Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides, in part, that "'[r]epresentatives
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case defining the duty is Vaca v. Sipes.8 In Vaca, the Supreme
Court stated that a union has "a statutory obligation to serve the in-
terest of all members [of a designated unit] without hostility or dis-
crimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good
faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." If a union fails
to perform this duty, it is subject to suit by an employee. 10
I
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
8. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). A union's duty of fair representation was first enunciated
in cases arising under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). R.
Gorman, supra note 1, at 695-96; e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U.S. 768, 773 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engine-
men, 338 U.S. 232, 239 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 211, 213 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 204 (1944). The Steele Court found that the duty was implied in the RLA provi-
sion that the union is the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in a
bargaining unit, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976). 323 U.S. at 199-203. The duty of fair repre-
sentation was subsequently extended to cases arising under the NLRA. R. Gorman,
supra note 1, at 697; e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Syres
v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curirn); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1953). See generally Blumrosen, The Worker and Three
Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Rela-
tionship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435, 1469-1501 (1963); Clark, The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 1119 (1973); Cox, The Duty of
Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1957); Lewis, Fair Representation in Griev-
ance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; Rosen, Fair Representa-
tion, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the
Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 Hastings L.J. 391 (1964); Summers, The Indi-
vidual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair
Representation?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251 (1977).
9. 386 U.S. at 177; accord, IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979); Abilene
Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 347 (5th Cir. 1980); Hamilton v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, 612 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1979); Deboles v. TWA, Inc., 552
F.2d 1005, 1014 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Dwyer v. Climatrol
Indus., Inc., 544 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977);
Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 6,18 (10th Cir. 1973); Local 13,
Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d
1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); Jamison v. Olga Coal
Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 461 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
10. E.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 453-54 (8th
Cir.) (union breached duty of fair representation when hostile union president
guaranteed that employee's grievance would be rejected, and union failed to contest
"irrational and discriminatory" decision of grievance committeec), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 924 (1975); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,
AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 285 (1st Cir.) (union breached duty of fair representation
when it failed to make any investigation or judgment as to merits of employee's
grievance), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Baker v. 'Unit Parts Co., 487 F. Supp.
1313, 1315 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (union breached duty of fair representation when it
told discharged employee it would process her grievance and then failed to do so). A
union has some discretion in its representation of employees. E.g., Humphrey v.
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No express federal statute of limitations governs either a section
301 or a fair representation claim.1' A basic task for courts, there-
fore, is to determine the applicable limitations periods. Addressing
the question whether to fashion a federal statute of limitations for
section 301 claims,' the Supreme Court, in UAW v. Hoosier Cardi-
nal Corp.," stated the general rule that courts should look to the
statutes of limitations of the forum state when a federal statute fails to
specify a limitations period. 14 Although characterization of the action
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (union does not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion by dovetailing seniority lists of merging companies); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330, 337-43 (1953) (union does not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion by accepting collective bargaining agreement provision that granted seniority
credit for pre-employment military credit); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 203 (1944) (union does not breach it duty of fair representation by negotiating a
contract that favors some members of the craft over others provided that the distinc-
tions imposed by the contract terms are "based on differences relevant to the autho-
rized purposes of the contract.").
11. Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides a six-month limitation provision for unfair
labor practice suits, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976), but courts have declined to apply this
time period to duty of fair representation actions. Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de
Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 877 (1970); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 601 (D. Minn. 1973);
Tuma v. American Can Co., 367 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (D.N.J. 1973).
12. Originally, there was a question whether § 301 was merely jurisdictional, or
whether it conferred substantive rights. Compare United Steelworkers, C.I.O. v.
Galland-Genning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1957) and Mercury Oil Ref.
Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, C.I.O., 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) with
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 235 F.2d
298, 300 (2d Cir. 1956) and United Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v. Oliver
Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court resolved this ques-
tion in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), holding that §
301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
... collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451; accord, Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
13. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
14. Id. at 703-05. The Supreme Court has applied this rule consistently when
federal statutes have failed to specify a period of limitations. E.g., Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1794-95 (1980) (Civil Rights Act § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1953
(Supp. 11 1979)); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (Federal Reserve Act
of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 23, 38 Stat. 273 (1913) (repealed 1959)); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (Sherman Act,
ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976))). Courts
do not formulate statutes of limitations as that is essentially a legislative function
involving questions of policy. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945). An alternative, to have no limitations period, would create "'a class of priv-
ileged plaintiffs who . .. are outside the pale of the law, and subject to no limitation
of time in which they may institute their actions. . . . 'This would be utterly repug-
nant to the genius of our laws."' Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895)
(quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805)); accord, Note, De-
velopments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1266 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; see Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
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to determine the appropriate statute of limitations is ultimately a
question of federal law,' 5 the Court said that "there is no reason to
reject the characterization that state law would impose unless that
characterization is unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent with na-
tional labor policy."' 6
Although this rule seems simple enough, its application is often
complicated when an employee elects to join a section 301 claim and
a fair representation claim. 7 Some courts hold that, when the claims
are joined, the statutes of limitations may differ. 8 Many courts,
however, have concluded that federal labor policy dictates the utiliza-
tion of identical limitations periods."9 This Note contends that proper
application of the Hoosier rule compels courts to employ different
105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 803-04, 804 n.27 (1957). See generally Note, Federal Stat-
utes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 68 (1953).
15. 383 U.S. at 706; Locals 2222, 2320-2327, IBEW v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 628 F.2d 644, 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Copitas v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d
1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1930); Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215, 217 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); Allen v. McWilliams Elec. Co., 494 F.
Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. I11. 1980).
16. 383 U.S. at 706; accord, Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 633-34
(1941), overruled on other grounds, 406 U.S. 320 (1972); Locals 2222, 2320-2327,
IBEW v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 644, 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Copitas
v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1980); Smart v. Ellis
Trucking Co., 580 F.2d 215, 217 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958
(1979); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F. Supp. 1024,
1035 n.12 (D.N.J. 1977); Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp.
541, 554 (N.D. III. 1976); Priest v. Wolverine Express, Inc., 87 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2774, 2775 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
17. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 119 (1980); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv.,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
18. Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Fehd v. Keebler Co., 98 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2329, 2329-30 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Brooks v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 97
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2616, 2617 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 383 F.
Supp. 787, 793 (N.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1976); Craig v. Bemis Co., 374 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
19. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514"F.2d 442, 448 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251-52
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Erickson v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 82 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,136, at 16,521 (D. Minn. 1977); Grant v. Mulvi-
hill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46-48 (N.D. I11. 1976); Buchholtz v.
Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 602-04 (D. Minn. 1973); see Mitchell v. UPS, Inc., 624
F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 265 (.1980) (No. 80-169); Gallagher
v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980);
Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 1978); War-
ren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1976); Mikelson
v. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co., 359 F. Supp. 444, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
1062 [Vol. 49
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
statutes of limitations even when the two claims are joined. Part I
demonstrates that the claim against the employer is properly char-
acterized as in contract, and that the claim against the union is either
statutory or tortious in nature. Part II observes that these differing
characterizations result in application of different statutes of limita-
tions, and contends that federal labor policy is not such an overriding
concern as to merit altering this result.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CLAIMS
Although the collective bargaining agreement is "technically an
agreement between two signatory parties," the employer and the
union,' courts and commentators have consistently emphasized its
uniqueness, "reecho[ing] the litany that 'a collective [bargaining]
agreement is not an ordinary contract.' "2M Because the nature of the
collective bargaining agreement is not clearly defined,- it has been
analogized to a trade agreement,2 a third-party beneficiary contract, 2
and an agent's contract on behalf of its principal.23 One commenta-
tor, however, has observed that "[n]o one doubts that a collective
agreement is a 'contract,' no matter which of many definitions of that
term one selects." ' Therefore, it is well-settled that an employee's
section 301 claim against his employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement is most reasonably characterized as in
contract.27
20. R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 540.
21. Summers, supra note 1, at 526 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Living-
ston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)); accord, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960); Areo Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d
698, 699 (10th Cir. 1980); Local Joint Executive Bd., AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc.,
613 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1980); Cox, supra note 1, at 1-5; St. Antoine, Contract
Enforcement and the Courts, 15 Lab. L.J. 583, 585 (1964).
22. Feller, supra note 1, at 663.
23. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1944); Cox, supra note 1, at
19.
24. J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944); Marranzano v. Riggs Natl
Bank, 184 F.2d 349, 350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387
F. Supp. 594, 598 (E.D. Va. 1975); Cox, supra note 1, at 20; Feller, supra note 1, at
663 & n.1.
25. Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 85, 259 N.W. 798, 799
(1935).
26. Summers, supra note 1. at 527.
27. Warren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir.
1976); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 446-47 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Kennedy v. Vheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 81
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2349, 2350 (4th Cir. 1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d
1234, 1252-53 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Grant v. Mulvihill
Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Blumrosen, supra note
8. at 1487; Note, Statute of Limitations Governing Fair Representation Action
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A cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation has
been variously characterized as contractual,2 statutory,29 or tortious.'
The latter two characterizations are reasonable; the first is not.
It is evident from an examination of the source and nature of the
duty of fair representation that it is not contractual. Because the duty
applies to both union and nonunion employees,3 it does not arise
from any contractual relationship between an employee and his
union.' In addition, the duty of fair representation does not origi-
Against Union When Brought With Section 301 Action Against Employer, 44 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 418, 423 n.36 (1976).
28. Mitchell v. UPS, Inc., 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
265 (1980) (No. 80-169); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771,
773 (4th Cir. 1978); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428
F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 604 (D.
Minn. 1973).
29. Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1978); Gray
v. Heat & Frost Insulators Local 51, 416 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1969); Canada v.
UPS, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
30. Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Daniels v. Steamfitters' Local 342, 95
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3290, 3291 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co., 409 F.
Supp. 129, 132 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 580
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); Pesola v. Inland Tool &
Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F.
Supp. 724, 729 (W.D. Va. 1975); Priest v. Wolverine Express, Inc., 87 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2774, 2775 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 1468-69, 1485-88.
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 201-02 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 32,3 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S.
248, 255-56 (1944); Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 347 (5th Cir.
1980); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978);
Teamsters Local 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Richardson v.
Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 1971); Abrams v. Carrier
Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1254 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Seay
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1970); Figueroa do
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1048,
1050 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
32. Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1978); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425
F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446
F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (N.D. I. 1978); Feller, supra note 1, at 813. Characterization
of an employee's claim against his union as contractual based solely on his mem-
bership in the union would lead to the unsatisfactory result of having nonunion em-
ployee suits subject to a shorter statute of limitations than union employee suits.
Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F. 2d
281, 286 (1st Cir.) ("It would be bizarre indeed if the non-union employees were
considered to have a tort claim for unfair representation, with generally a shorter
limitations period, while union members' claims sounded in contract and were thus
subject to a longer limitation period."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
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nate from the collective bargaining agreement.' It is an obligation
created and imposed by federal labor law,4 existing both before and
after the collective bargaining agreement has been executed.?
Furthermore, a breach of the duty may be found when a union's
actions are unrelated to any terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.3 6  Often, however, a term of the agreement is
involved. 37 It has been contended that in such situations an em-
33. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 201-02 & n.4 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring);
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 356 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Sinyard v.
Foote & Davies Div. of McCall Corp., 577 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v.
Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 500 F.2d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1974);
Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 1971); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 285-
86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Nedd v. UMV, 400 F.2d 103,
105-06 (3d Cir. 1968); Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 463 (S.D. W.
Va. 1971); Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755, 772 (E.D.
Mo. 1965), affd, 365 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967);
Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 1468; Feller, supra note 1, at 807, 825. But see Hensley
v. United Transps., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (N.D. Tcx. 1972) (collective bar-
gaining agreement provided that the "Union is required .. .to represent all of the
employees ... fairly and equally"). The Hensley case is the only case research has
revealed in which the collective bargaining agreement expressly provided that the
union represent employees fairly. Of course, in such cases characterization of the
claim against the union as contractual would be appropriate.
34. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Deboles v.
TWA, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005, 1014 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Bond
v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975); Abrams v.
Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009
(1971); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp.
1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 461 (S.D.
W. Va. 1971); see note 7 supra and accompanying text.
35. Smith v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 500 F.2d 741, 746 (5th
Cir. 1974); Thacker v. Palm Beach Co., 450 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Tenn. 1978);
Cox, supra note 8, at 156. The duty of fair representation was first developed in
cases involving the union's representation of employees during the collective bargain-
ing process, before an agreement had been reached. See, e.g., Graham v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 239 (1949); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
36. In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal docketed sub nom.
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Carter, 49 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1980)
(No. 80-733); Smith v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 500 F.2d 741, 746
(5th Cir. 1974); Retana v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14,
453 F.2d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 1972); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 729
(W.D. Va. 1975); see Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971) ('[B]reach of a union's duty of fair
representation [is] judicially cognizable . .. whether or not the lawsuit (is] bottomed
on a collective agreement."); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957) ('Among
other things, [the duty of fair representation] involves .. . resolution of new prob-
lems not covered by existing agreements .... ).
37. E.g., Self v. Drivers Local 61, 620 F.2d 439, 440-41 (4th Cir. 1980) (wrongful
discharge provision); Melendy v. United States Postal Serv., 589 F.2d 256, 257 (7th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (disciplinary suspension provision); Lewis v. Greyhound
Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (wrongful discharge provi-
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ployee's fair represention claim is "intimately related" to the section
301 claim against his employer and should be given a contractual
characterization.' The Supreme Court in Vaca, however, made clear
that an employee suit against an employer and a union involves sepa-
rate and distinct claims.' Moreover, a union will not be liable solely
because it refused to process an employee's claim according to the
procedure provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.4" A
breach of the duty of fair representation is found only when a union's
actions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Therefore,
although in a given case the collective bargaining contract may have
"provided an occasion upon which the union's preexisting obligation
to serve the plaintiffs came into play,"2 a breach of the duty of fair
representation is not a breach of the labor contract.43
sion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Baldwin v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 645, 645-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (seniority provision).
38. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1009 (1971); accord, Mitchell v. UPS, Inc., 624 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 265 (1980) (No. 80-169); Howard v. Aluminum Workers
Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 1978); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv.,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Buchholtz V. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581,
604 (D. Minn. 1973).
39. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967); accord, Kaiser v. Local 83, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Harrison v.
Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1977); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); NLRB
v. Local 485, Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 454 F.2d 17, 21 (2d
Cir. 1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Pack-
inghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970);
Cronin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 445 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Mo.), affd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 588 F.2d 616 (1978); Grant v. Mulvihill Bros.
Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D. II1. 1976); Williams v. Dana Corp., 54
F.R.D. 473, 474 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Courts have held that an employee may main-
tain an action against his union even though it has been determined that the em-
ployer did not breach the collective bargaining agreement. Kaiser v. Local 83, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1978); Christopher v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 476 F. Supp. 950, 953 (E.D. Tex. 1979); see Summers, supra note 8, at 279.
40. Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 285-
86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446 F. Supp.
1048, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
41. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc.,
607 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1979); Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's
Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1979); Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580
F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978); Kaiser v. Local 83, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d
642, 644 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 F.2d
439, 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1977); Griesemer v. Retail Store
Employees Local 1393, 482 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
42. Nedd v. UMW, 400 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1968).
43. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 202 n.4 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Smith v.
Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 500 F.2d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1974);
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Characterization of the fair representation claim as statutory is most
appropriate when the forum state has a limitations period for statu-
tory causes of action." A statutory claim has been defined as "one in
which no element of agreement enters [and] .. .which the law cre-
ates in the absence of an agreement."" The duty of fair representa-
tion clearly does not arise from any agreement between either the
union and the employer or the union and the employee.-r Rather,
it is derived from the union's status under federal labor law as exclu-
sive bargaining agent.' It is this statutory power that gives rise to
Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 1971); Nedd v.
UMW, 400 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1968); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1048,
1052 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 902-03 (D.
Me. 1970).
44. Twenty-four states have statutes of limitations for statutory liabilities, Blume
& George, Limitations and The Federal Courts, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 937, 967 & n.115
(1951), and federal courts have not been hesitant to adopt these statutes of limitations
for claims against the union. Archer v. Airline Pilots Assn Int'l, 609 F.2d 934, 937
(9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980); Price v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1978); Gray v. Heat & Frost Insulators
Local 51, 416 F.2d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 1969); Heritage v. Board of Educ., 447 F.
Supp. 1240, 1243-44 (D. Del. 1978); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1048, 1052
(N.D. IlM. 1978); Lowther v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2278, 2279-80 (N.D. Ohio 1977); DeVries v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 91
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2764, 2767 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber
Co., 68 F.R.D. 287, 293-94 (D. Del. 1975). Courts have applied a statute of limita-
tions for statutory claims to actions arising under other federal statues. E.g., Copitas
v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1980) (Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 §§ 101(a)(2), 609, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 529
(1976)); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 350
F.2d 936, 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1965) (Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 303,
29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976)), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 904 (1966); Smith v. Cremins, 308
F.2d 187, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1962) (Civil Rights Act § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. In
1979)).
45. Gardner v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 44 Cal.2d 191, 194, 281 P.2d 521, 522
(1955) (en banc).
46. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
47. Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1978); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425
F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Canada v. UPS, Inc., 446
F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see Feller, supra note 1, at 813.
48. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); NLRB v. Postal Workers St. Louis
Local, 618 F.2d 1249, 1254 (8th Cir. 1980); Teamsters Local 30 v. Helms Express
Inc., 591 F.2d 211, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837 (1979); Howard v.
Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978); Sinyard v. Foote
& Davies Div. of McCall Corp., 577 F.2d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 1978); Dwyer v. Chima-
trol Indus. Inc., 544 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977);
Hazen v. Western Union Tel. Co., 518 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1975); Woods v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648 (10th Cir. 1973); Retana v. Apart-
ment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (9th Cir.
1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Feller, supra note 1, at 807.
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the corresponding obligation to represent fairly the interests of all
members of the bargaining unit.49
For states that do not have a statute of limitations for statutory
claims, the most reasonable alternative characterization of the fair
representation claim is in tort. It has been observed that the duty of
fair representation is "akin to ... the duty of due care normally
associated with tort actions."' This analogy is even more compelling
in view of the finding of some courts that a union breached its duty
when its actions were merely negligent. 1 For instance, in Ruzicka V.
General Motors Corp.,S2 the Sixth Circuit held that the union's negli-
gent failure to file a written grievance on time constituted a breach of
the duty of fair representation.
Indeed, many courts have characterized fair representation claims
as tortious.' As one court noted, when "suit is based on the unions'
alleged breach of a duty ... , the complaint clearly sounds in
49. NLRB v. Postal Workers St. Louis Local, 618 F.2d 1249, 1254 (8th Cir.
1980); Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 826 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980); Sanderson v. Ford
Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1973); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union,
429 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1970).
50. Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO,
425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); accord, Howard v.
Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Clco
Wrap Corp., 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3211, 3213 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Pesola v. Inland
Tool & Mfg., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Summers, supra note 8,
at 277-78.
51. IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 53 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Milstead
v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1978); Ruzicka v. General
Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975). Other courts have adopted a gross
negligence standard. Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891
(4th Cir. 1980); Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th
Cir. 1978); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-
CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir. 1970). See generally Note, Determining Standards
for a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65
Cornell L. Rev. 634 (1980); Note, Labor Arbitration, the Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, and "'Union Negligence," 54 St. John's L. Rev. 357 (1980).
52. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 310.
54. Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 114 (5th Cir. 1973); Figueroa
de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Williams v. Cleo Wrap Corp., 98
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3211, 3212 (W.D. Tenn. 1978); Daniels v. Steamfitters' Local 342,
95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3290, 3291 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Pesola v. Inland Tool & Mfg., Inc.,
423 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724,
729 (W.D. Va. 1975); Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292,
297-98 (M.D.N.C. 1970); see Read v. Local Lodge 1284, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
528 F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir. 1975) (Delaware statute of limitations for personal injuries
applied); Fehd v. Keebler Co., 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2329, 2329 (N.D. Ga. 1978)
(Georgia statute of limitations for personal injuries applied); Brooks v. Southwestern
Transp. Co., 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2616, 2617 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Texas statute of
limitations for personal injuries applied).
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tort. "'" Even courts that have held that both claims should be gov-
erned by the same period of limitations, and have imposed a contract
statute of limitations on the claim against the union, have conceded
that "characterization of the Union's breach as tortious conduct is
fitting."
II. FEDERAL LABOR POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
State statutes of limitations for contract actions are generally longer
than those governing statutory or tort claims.Y Therefore, proper
characterization according to the Hoosier rule will necessarily result
in the employer and union being subject to liability for differing
periods of time.- Some courts, however, have held that federal
labor policy requires that, when section 301 and fair representation
claims are joined, they be governed by the same statute of
limitations.-
Hoosier made clear, however, that questions concerning statutes of
limitations ordinarily do not implicate federal labor policy." Address-
ing the question whether to establish a uniform statute of limitations
for section 301 suits, the Court stated that
[t]he need for uniformity . . . is greatest where its absence would
threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes that
55. Coleman v. Kroger Co., 399 F. Supp. 724, 729 (,V.D. Va. 1975).
56. Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46 (N.D. Ill.
1976); accord, Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 448 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Erickson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
82 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,136, at 16,521 (D. Minn. 1977).
57. See Blume & George, supra note 44, at 999-1001. The mean statute of limita-
tions for contract actions is six years. Id. at 999. For statutory causes of action, it is
three years, id. at 1000, and for actions for personal injury, it is two years. Id. at
1001.
58. See Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-
CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir.) ("[W]e are satisfied that the proper legal analysis of
the union's and employer's duties in cases such as this requires the imposition of
different state statutes of limitations .... *), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
59. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 448 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251-52
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Erickson v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 82 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,136, at 16,521 (D. Minn. 1977); Grant v. Mulvi-
hill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46-48 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Buchholtz v.
Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581, 602-04 (D. Minn. 1973); see Mitchell v. UPS, Inc., 624
F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 265 (1980) (No. 80-169); Gallagher
v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 199 (1980);
Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 1978); War-
ren v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 337 (8th Cir. 1976); Mikelson
v. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co., 359 F. Supp. 444, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
60. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966). The limitations
question is usually concerned only with whether the plaintiff has filed a timely claim.
United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1976); Newman v. Freeman,
262 F. Supp. 106, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Developments, supra note 14, at 1179.
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federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-the formation of
the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes
under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play
only when these processes have already broken down. Lack of uni-
formity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any impor-
tant way the achievement of any significant goal of labor policy."
This reasoning is equally applicable to the cluestion whether the stat-
utes of limitations in an employee's suit against both his employer
and union should be the same. These suits are also brought only after
the grievance procedure provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement has failed to settle an employee's claim.62
Although Hoosier states the general rule that statutes of limitations
do not normally involve considerations of federal labor policy, some
courts have relied on a later Supreme Court decision, Vaca v. Sipes,'
to conclude that suits involving joinder of section 301 and fair repre-
sentation claims raise particular federal labor policy problems that
may only be remedied by application of the same statute of
limitations.61 The Vaca Court held that state and federal court
jurisdiction over fair representation suits is not preempted
61. 383 U.S. at 702; accord, Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpen-
ters, 619 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. See notes 3-10 supra and accompanying text. In Santos v. District Council of
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 619 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1980), a suit to enforce an arbitra-
tion award, the court noted that "[b]y definition, actions to enforce arbitration awards
will arise only after efforts to settle the dispute through private channels have failed.
At that late stage, as the Court observed in Hoosier Cardinal, the lack of uniformity
inherent in borrowing limitations periods is unlikely to interfere in any important
way with any significant goal of national labor policy." Id. at 968 (citations and foot-
notes omitted).
63. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
64. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 119 (1980); Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442,
448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d
1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1(109 (1971); Grant v. Mulvihill
Bros. Motor Sew., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (N.D. II!. 1976).
65. The well-recognized test for preemption in labor law is known as the Gannon
doctrine. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Count), Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 187-90 (1978); Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296 &
n.6 (1977); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 284-85 (1971). In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Car-
mon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Supreme Court held that "[wihen an activity is argu-
ably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRAI, the States as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245. See
generally Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual
Rights, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 1037 (1973); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv.
L. Rev. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation
of Garmon, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 469 (1972).
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merely because breach of that duty may be an unfair labor practice
subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).' One rationale for the Court's holding was that, because an
employee is excused from the exhaustion of remedies requirement
when his union has breached its duty of fair representation, "it is
obvious that the courts will be compelled to pass upon whether there
has been a breach of [this] duty ... in the context of many [section]
301" suits.' The Court reasoned that "a court that has litigated the
fault of employer and union" should be able to fashion a remedy with
respect to both parties.6 In footnote twelve, the Court elaborated on
the remedy problems that might arise if an employee had to bring his
claims before "two independent tribunals, [the NLRB and a court,]
with different procedures, time limitations, and remedial powers." '
Blindly adhering to footnote twelve, the Sixth Circuit summarily
concluded that both claims should be subject to the same limitations
period.7 Such reliance on Vaca as an expression of federal labor
policy, however, is unfounded. The Vaca Court was merely making
an observation by way of dicta in a footnote,-' not a definitive com-
ment on what should result if a claim against a union were time-
barred.
The Vaca requirement that damages in a suit against both an em-
ployer and a union be apportioned :2 has been used by some courts to
66. 386 U.S. at 176-77; accord, William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16 (1974); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971). The NLRB held, in 1962,
that breach of the duty of fair representation is also an unfair labor practice under §
8(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185
(1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
67. 386 U.S. at 187. It has been noted that a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation by a union "may open the way not only to a suit against itself, but also
against the employer." Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir.
1973); accord, Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 383 F. Supp. 787, 795 (N.D. Ala.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. 386 U.S. at 187.
69. Id. at 188 n.12 (emphasis added).
70. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.). cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
71. As noted by Justice Fortas, Vaca "is not an action by the employee against
the employer, and the discussion of the requisites of such an action is, in my judg-
ment, unnecessary." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 199-200 (1967) (Fortas. J., concur-
ring); accord, Clayton v. I"T Gilfillan, 623 F.2d 563, 567 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980). cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980).
72. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196-98 (1967). The Vaca Court held that "It]he
governing principle... is to apportion liability between the employer and the union
according to the damage caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable
solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but
increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal to process the griev-
ance should not be charged to the employer." Id. at 197-98, accord. Wyatt v. In-
terstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir. 1980); Soto Segarra v.
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justify holding that both of the employee's claims be governed by the
same statute of limitations.7 3 The rationale is that a court will be
unable to apportion damages properly if the claim against the union is
time-barred."' Nowhere, however, did the Vaca Court say that
federal labor policy requires that both parties actually be before the
court for damages to be properly apportioned. In fact, a later Su-
preme Court decision, Czosek v. O'Mara,7 held that damages may be
apportioned despite one party's absence. In Czosek, a suit brought
pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (RLA), M an employee sued both
his employer and union after his allegedly wrongful discharge. 7 The
lower court dismissed the claim against the employer because the
employee had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as re-
quired by the RLA. 78  The union challenged this dismissal,
"[a]pparently fearing that if sued alone they [might] be forced to pay
damages for which the employer [was] . . . responsible."'79 Rejecting
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 297-98 (1st Cir. 1978); Harrison v. Chrysler
Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1977); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523
F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975); Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644,
648 (10th Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 981-82
(8th Cir. 1971); Nedd v. UMW, 400 F.2d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1968). See generally
Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for Damages Between Employer and Union
in § 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30
Mercer L. Rev. 661 (1979).
73. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447-48 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Wallace v. AT&T Co., 460 F. Supp.
755, 759-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F,2d 750,
753 (9th Cir. 1978).
74. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447-48 (8th Cir.)
("[O]nly by providing the same limitations period against both employer and union,
will the court be able to fashion a remedy which properly allocates the damages
between them." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Wallace v.
AT&T Co., 460 F. Supp. 755, 760 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Courts would have difficulty "in
attempting to adhere to the apportionment principle if, because of differing statutes
of limitations, both union and employer were not actually before the court.").
75. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
76. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). NLRA cases, although not controlling, are con-
sidered analogous to RLA cases. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Ter-
minal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969); Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F. Supp.
1356, 1363 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. International Bhd,
of Teamsters, 275 F. Supp. 986, 997-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
77. 397 U.S. at 26.
78. O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd
sub nom. Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). Under § 3 First (i) of the RLA, 45
U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976), employees and carriers must submit unsettled disputes
to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Walker v Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196,
198 (1966) (per curiam); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957). Subsequent to Czosek, the Supreme Court held that a
Board decision on the merits is not subject to judicial review. Andrews v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 325 (1972).
79. 397 U.S. at 28-29.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
these fears as groundless, the Court stated that "[a]ssuming ...
wrongful discharge by the employer ... and a subsequent discrim-
inatory refusal by the union to process grievances based on the dis-
charge, damages against the union ... are unrecoverable except to
the extent that its refusal to handle the grievances added to the diffi-
culty and expense of collecting from the employer."0"
A related concern of courts that maintain that damages may only be
properly apportioned if both the employer and the union are before
the court is that, when the claim against the union is time-barred,
the employee will be unable to obtain full relief."I To assert that full
relief is required, and therefore, that the fair representation claim
may not be subject to a shorter statute of limitations is illogical. Car-
rying the full relief argument to its extreme would result in no limita-
tions period whatsoever, a possibility that the Supreme Court has
rejected.8" Furthermore, "[w]hile adoption of relatively short
[statutory] periods will prevent the fullest possible realization of...
compensatory aims . . . , such is the inevitable result of any time bar
to recovery." 1
Moreover, to attempt to resolve the full relief problem by holding
that the section 301 and fair representation claims should be gov-
erned by the same limitation provision may lead to the anomalous
result that an employee will be unable to obtain any relief. Such was
the outcome in Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp.,' an employee suit join-
ing claims against his employer and union. The district court had
dismissed both claims as barred by Michigan's three-year statute of
limitations governing actions for injury to persons or property.A The
employee appealed only the ruling with respect to the claim against
his employer." The court of appeals held that "in an action against
an employer and a Union under [the] LMRA, the same statute of
limitations ordinarily should apply as to both defendants."8 Because
the claim against the union had been held governed by the three-
year statute of limitations," the court also applied this limitation to
80. Id. at 29.
81. Gallagher v. Chrysler Corp., 613 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 119 (1980); Price v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 753 (9th
Cir. 1978); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971).
82. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895); see note 14 supra.
83. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (foot-
note omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); accord, Dedmon v. Falls Prods.
Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962).
84. 613 F.2d 167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
85. Id. at 168.
86. Id. The employee did not object to the characterization of the duty of fair
representation claim as tortious. Petition for Certiorari at 7 n. 1. Callagher v. Chrys-
ler Corp., 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
87. 613 F.2d at 169 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 168.
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the claim against the employer" Both claims being time-barred, the
employee was unable to recover against either defendant.2 If the
court had applied the contract statute of limitations to the claim
against the employer, the employee might have at least recovered
damages attributable to that defendant.9
In addition to not being inconsistent with federal labor policy, ap-
plication of a shorter statute of limitations to fair representation
claims is in accord with Supreme Court decisions that indicate a de-
sire to protect the financial stability of labor organizations. When the
Court has addressed issues involving the duty of fair representation,
it has weighed the rights of the individual employees against the in-
terests of the collective bargaining unit as a whole. 2  In Vaca v.
Sipes," for example, the court held that an employee does not have
an absolute right to bring his grievance to arbitration.1 One of the
Court's concerns was that if employees did have such a right, many
more claims would be submitted to arbitration.' The Court feared
that "[t]his would greatly increase the cost of the grievance machin-
ery and could so overburden the arbitration process as to prevent it
from functioning successfully." 9 Additionally, the Vaca Court stated
that because damages must be apportioned, a union may not be liable
for any damages caused by an employer's breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.97 In IBEW v. Foust,98 the Court noted that
89, Id. The Sixth Circuit is the first circuit not to apply the contract statute of
limitations to the claim against the employer. Petition for Certiorari at 11, Gallagher
v. Chrysler Corp., 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
90, 613 F.2d at 168.
91. See note 72 supra.
92. IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1979); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
190-93 (1967); see Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1236 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 116 (1980); Milstead v. Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d
232, 236 (6th Cir. 1978); Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 956-57 (5th
Cir. 1976). See generally Clark, supra note 8, at 1120-21; The Supreme Court, 1966
Term, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 253 (1967).
93. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
94. Id. at 191; accord, Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union
No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 455 (2d Cir. 1979); Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 519,
525 (3d Cir. 1973); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972); Lomax v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 433 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1970); Figueroa de Arroyo v.
Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 283-84 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
95. 386 U.S. at 191-92.
96. Id. at 192.
97. Id. at 197; accord, IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1979); Miller v.
Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 275 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980); Crawford v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290, 295 (D. Wyo. 1974). Damages resulting
from an employer's breach of a collective bargaining agreement may not be assessed
against a union even when the union has an indemnification agreement with the
employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
98. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
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"[a]lthough this apportionment rule might in some instances effec-
tively immunize unions from liability for a clear breach of duty, the
[Vaca] Court found considerations of deterrence insufficient to risk
endangering the financial stability of such institutions."''  Finally, in
Foust, the Court held that punitive damages may not be awarded in
fair representation suits."°  The Court was concerned that holding
otherwise would "undermine [the] careful accomodation" between
the individual employee's interest in obtaining "redress for injuries
caused by union misconduct" and "the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited funds." ,- Similarly, application of a
contract statute of limitations to fair representation claims would re-
sult in an increased number of suits against unions, " with a concom-
itant strain on union funds. Application of a shorter statute of limita-
tions, however, would not prejudice an employee's right to relief. '
Moreover, applying a shorter statute of limitations to the claim
against the union, regardless of whether it is joined with a section
301 claim against the employer, is in accord with the basic purposes
of limitations periods. Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose,",'
designed to assure fairness to defendants." Limitations periods pre-
99. Id. at 50.
100. Id. at 52. The lower courts do not agree on whether punitive damages are
per se invalid in fair representation suits, Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d
107, 109 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), or whether the Foust rule applies only when the union
has failed to process an employee's grievance properly. Anderson v. United Paper-
workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 484 F. Supp. 77, 85 (D. Minn. 1980).
101. 442 U.S. at 50.
102. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1193; Note, Limitation Borrowing in
Federal Courts, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1125, 1129 (1979); Note, An Interest-Analysis
Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 292, 302
(1974).
103. Courts that apply a contract statute of limitations to both § 301 and fair rep-
resentation claims when joined have no qualms about applying a shorter statute of
limitations when confronted with only a fair representation claim against the union.
Compare Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir.
1978) (dictum) and Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971) and Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor Serv., Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 45, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1976) with Santos v. District Council of United Bhd.
of Carpenters, 619 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1980) and Howard v. Aluminum Workers
Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1978) and Grant v. Mulvihill Bros. Motor
Serv., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (dictum).
104. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 119 (1979); Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz
Bros., 452 F.2d 1346, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406
F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969); Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833,
836 (3d Cir. 1965); Dedmon v. Falls Prods. Inc., 299 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1962).
105. Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394, 400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 101 S.
Ct. 99 (1980); Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 720 n.8 (6th Cir. 1980), Smith v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978); Hodgson v.
Local 851, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 454 F.2d 545, 549 (7th
107.51981]
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vent stale claims and unfair surprise.' Potential defendants should
"be able to rely upon the statutes in planning for litigation and the
payment of claims."'07 These purposes would be undermined if the
length of time that a union is subject to suit depends on whether an
employee decides to join his two claims."'
Because an employee must prove that the union breached its duty
of fair representation to bring suit against his employer,"' stale evi-
dence will be introduced despite nonjoinder of the union as a defen-
dant. Therefore, some courts contend that "the traditional argument
favoring statutes of limitations -that claims based on stale evidence
ought to be barred-is simply not applicable." 110 These courts,
however, fail to recognize that the propriety of using stale evidence
depends on the use to which it is put.
Statutes of limitations are viewed as extinguishing only the right to
a remedy, not the underlying claim."' Although a statute of limita-
tions may bar a direct action, a plaintiff may still assert that claim
defensively or collaterally, utilizing the same evidence."' Therefore,
the purpose of statutes of limitations is not to preclude stale evidence
in all instances, but to prevent such evidence from being used to
impose liability. This distinction is crucial when an employee seeks to
sue his employer and union. If the claim against the union is time-
barred, use of evidence of breach of the duty of fair representation is
permissible to determine whether the employee has exhausted his
Cir. 1971); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 530 n.16 (4th Cir. 1970);
Developments, supra note 14, at 1185.
106. Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir. 1977); Kreiger v. United States,
539 F.2d 317, 322 (3d Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d
979, 994 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
107. Kutner, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: The Effects of Statutes of Limita-
tions and Other Time Limitations, 33 Okla. L. Rev. 203, 221 (1980); accord, Gates
Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975); Newman v. Freeman,
262 F. Supp. 106, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
108. See Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-
CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); cf. Kutner,
supra note 107, at 221 (policy of reliance on statutes of limitations undermined by
allowing contribution between two tortfeasors when statute of limitations has run
with respect to one).
109. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
110. Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 447 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); accord, Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234,
1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., 62
F.R.D. 581, 602 (D. Minn. 1973).
111. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895); Kalmich v. Bruno, 553
F.2d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir.
1976); Developments, supra note 14, at 1186-87.
112. Developments, supra note 14, at 1245, 1246.
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remedies," 3 a prerequisite to suit against the employer."' To allow
joinder of the claims and imposition of a longer statute of limitations
to the claim against the union, however, results in an impermissible
use of stale evidence.
CONCLUSION
An employee often joins a section 301 claim against his employer
with a fair representation claim against his union. Contrary to what
some courts have held, mere joinder of the claims does not make it
necessary or desirable that they be subject to the same statute of
limitations. Moreover, to hold that the same statute of limitations
must govern both causes of action is contrary to the rule that reason-
able characterizations of the claims not be rejected unless inconsistent
with federal labor policy. Because no federal labor policy requires
that the same statute of limitations apply to both claims, uniformity
should yield to the results of proper characterization.
Meredith Jane Boylan
113. See Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-
CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 286-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). A union is
not an indispensable party to an employee's § 301 suit against his employer. Kaiser
v. Local 83, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 577 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
Anderson v. Grocers Supply Co., 483 F. Supp. 73, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Rivera v.
NMU Pension & Welfare & Vacation Plan, 288 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D. La. 1968);
Serra v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 684, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
114. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
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